Summary
A nancial system plays a highly bene cial role in an economy by helping to transfer resources to sectors where they can be used most productively, with transfers taking place both across time and potential states of the world that could materialise. In principle, a perfect nancial system could insure the constituent sectors of an economy from the idiosyncratic risks that they face, so that uctuations in economic activity at the macroeconomic level would re ect only systematic shocks, ie those that affect all sectors. But nancial systems operate under frictions such as asymmetric information, where some market participants are better informed than others, and this makes nancial contracts costly to monitor and enforce. A practical view that appears to be becoming more widespread suggests that when nancial systems operate with frictions, economic shocks can be ampli ed and propagated, exaggerating economic upturns and prolonging the severity of economic downturns, and leave economies more vulnerable to such shocks during expansionary phases of the business cycle.
This paper outlines a model that analyses both how macroeconomic shocks can be ampli ed and how procyclical macroeconomic risk can be generated within a macro-nancial system. The model is constructed so that shocks that boost the productivity of one sector adversely affect the productivity of the other sectors. Thus, a series of shocks that raise the output of one sector, such as a clustering of technological innovations, will cause the economy to grow as this sector accounts for a greater and greater share of the total economy. And, as the economy becomes more concentrated, it becomes more vulnerable to the dominant sector being hit by an adverse shock at some point in the future.
The nancial system in the model allows risk-averse entrepreneurs in the economy to insulate their balance sheets against uncertainty. But nancial contracts must be supported by collateral, such as real estate, to ensure that promises to make payments in the future are credible. If the collateral asset is also used in production, a feedback loop between aggregate output and the value of collateral emerges. A key contribution of the paper is to show how such feedback loops are maintained in the presence of insurance markets. An initial decline in aggregate output reduces entrepreneurs' net worth and, hence, the price of the collateral asset, as demand for the asset for use in future production declines. The decline in the value of the collateral asset implies that producers are unable to obtain suf cient insurance, exposing balance sheets to shocks. Since entrepreneurs are risk-averse, their response to additional balance-sheet uncertainty is to reduce the scale of production. This leads to subsequent declines in the price of the collateral asset, completing the feedback loop. Any decline in its value as a result of incomplete insurance by one sector leads to inadequate insurance by other sectors. This externality increases the level of systemic risk across the economy. Systemic risk imposes welfare costs on the economy as it leads to inef cient production and results in balance-sheet uncertainty. Both aspects are captured by the model.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing concern that nancial systems in developed countries may have an excessively procyclical in uence on the wider economy -exaggerating economic upturns and increasing the severity and length of downturns. It has focused attention among policymakers on the welfare costs of nancial stability arising from the combined effect of nancial frictions and macroeconomic shocks. Increasingly, a`new view' of nancial stability is beginning to emerge -one emphasising the distortions affecting intertemporal savings and investment decisions that appear as nancial imbalances, such as an excessive build-up of credit or increased asset price volatility.
(1) The`new view' also lays stress on the endogeneity of risk over the business cycle as the capacity of the nancial system to share risks uctuates with shocks.
The presence of nancial frictions, such as limited commitment to nancial contracts, forces agents to confront a basic trade-off between sub-optimal levels of debt and insurance. Sub-optimal borrowing imparts inef ciencies via its impact on capital allocation in the economy. And inadequate insurance imparts an ampli cation mechanism, whereby shocks to the economy are magni ed and propagated via the nancial system, giving rise to excessive uctuations in economic activity. The welfare costs of nancial frictions in a macroeconomic setting are, thus, comprised of an ef ciency effect and a volatility effect.
(2) Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al (1999) show how ampli cation can arise when nancial frictions limit the ability of agents to commit to nancial contracts or to properly monitor investment projects. (3) But an unsatisfactory aspect of these models is that they do not permit a role for insurance markets that might allow agents to hedge themselves against shocks. In the presence of nancial frictions, inappropriate insurance by any one agent imposes risks on others in the nancial system, principally through exposure to a set of common factors. This pecuniary externality makes for inappropriate risk sharing by other agents, who end up not being properly diversi ed over the normal course of the business cycle, generating a build-up of systemic risk.
Inappropriate risk bearing by agents in the nancial system, therefore, plays a central role in the ampli cation of shocks and nancial instability.
(1) See, for example, Borio et al (2001) , Borio et al (2003) , and Haldane et al (2004) .
(2) Haldane et al (2004) discuss this issue in greater detail. (3) A partial list of models that also embed nancial frictions in a macroeconomic setting includes Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , Chen (2001), and Lorenzoni (2003) .
Recent work by Krishnamurthy (2003) demonstrates how the introduction of hedging eliminates the ampli cation channel in the Kiyotaki and Moore framework.
(4) Amplication of the effects of productivity shocks on output and prices only re-emerges when collateral constraints are applied to the suppliers of insurance. But these constraints only bind occasionally and an implication of the model is that the welfare costs of ampli cation arise only in extreme events, such as during a nancial crisis. As such, it fails to adequately characterise procyclicality and sits uneasily with the intuition of the`new view'. Agents may not be fully diversi ed over the normal course of the business cycle, and are usually overexposed to risk during the upturn.
In this paper, we develop a framework to explore how the risk-sharing capacity of the economy varies over the cycle and generates an ampli cation effect that leads to procyclical behaviour. The economy is treated as a composite of risky industries, each of which is subject to a sector-speci c shock. Complete nancial markets allow rms to invest in each other, enabling diversi cation of risk. Our model, thus, departs from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) by allowing for such insurance.
Like them, however, we introduce nancial frictions by assuming an absence of trust so that entrepreneurs are forced to use collateral to back nancial securities. Collateral, moreover, serves a dual role and is used by entrepreneurs in production.
The presence of collateral constraints means that agents are limited in the extent to which they can smooth consumption over time and states of the world, leaving them underinsured against risks from their own sectors. When shocks hit the economy, lucky sectors grow while those less fortunate shrink. As lucky sectors dominate, their in uence on aggregate activity grows, so the business cycle becomes driven mainly by shocks to the dominant sector and shocks to the smaller sector become relatively immaterial. And since the collateral asset links the sectors, there is a common exposure to a particular risk factor. Aggregate risk is, thus, procyclical since risk becomes more systematic as the upturn begins. In this respect, our model formalises the intuition of Borio et al (2001) and others of the`new view' school.
Our paper also shows that asset price uncertainty is a symptom of incomplete diversi cation.
When sectors are underinsured, the rise of a dominant sector means that sector-speci c shocks are not absorbed as well as as might be the case if sectors are similarly sized. The price of the collateral asset is subject to greater variation because fewer rms are able to stand on the other (4) Suarez and Sussman (1997) make a similar point, although in their model indexation of nancial contracts assumes centre stage.
side of the market (eg to buy, when the dominant sector sells).
Although the presence of state-contingent contracts allows agents to potentially insure away any uctuations in the price of the collateral asset, practices concerning the valuation of collateral also have implications for the credit cycle.
(5) We show that if there are margin requirements on the value of collateral holdings, or if collateral is relatively illiquid, collateral values cannot be fully insured and the ampli cation effect re-emerges. Since entrepreneurs insure less, a negative shock to the economy results in less wealth being transferred to the next period. Since collateral also serves in production, the reduced demand for the asset in the later period drives down its price.
But this, in turn, feeds back on to the collateral constraint tightening it further and lowering the extent of insurance even more. The ampli cation effect exacerbates the ef ciency costs of the nancial friction as well as the uncertainty surrounding asset prices in the economy.
Our model extends and develops the Krishnamurthy (2003) framework in a number of respects.
First, the Krishnamurthy model has only two sectors and generates ampli cation by imposing aggregate collateral constraints, ie requiring that both sectors -real and nancial -be nancially constrained, posting collateral to back nancial securities. By contrast, we introduce an additional sector and impose nancial frictions only on the entrepreneurs, leaving the nancial sector unconstrained throughout. Second, our ampli cation mechanism arises from the relative illiquidity of the collateral asset rather than via a premium on insurance due to limits in the supply of nance. The limited insurance of the individual entrepreneur places a pecuniary externality on the allocations of other agents via the price of the collateral asset. And third, our focus on risk-sharing over the cycle means that entrepreneurs in our model are risk averse (instead of risk neutral), while the nancial sector is risk-neutral and willing to accomodate any level of nancial claims at the actuarial price.
Several other points of contact with the literature are worthy of note. Schnabel and Shin (2004) and Cifuentes et al (2005) formally analyse how common exposures to illiquid assets on the balance sheet are a key source of systemic risk and can leave agents vulnerable to damaging uctuations in asset prices. Saint-Paul (1992) studies the interaction between nancial markets and risky technologies and shows how risk-diversi cation can lead to greater specialisation in production. Without nancial markets, agents limit risk by opting for less specialised (and less (5) Borio et al (2001) note that banks in Europe limit loan to value ratios to 60%-85% of the value of residential property, while in Hong Kong a`recommended' maximum loan to value ratio of 70% was in place during the 1990s.
productive) technologies. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show how productivity endogenously increases as diversi cation improves. In the early stages of develepment, agents seek insurance by investing in safe and unproductive assets. Since insurance opportunities are limited, development is highly random and only`lucky' economies grow and bene t from better diversi cation and productivity. Finally, Koren and Tenreyro (2004) examine how sectoral diversi cation affects the volatility of the business cycle.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model and introduces the sequence of events. Section 3 analyses the benchmark case of unrestricted and complete nancial markets, comparing the outcome with a rst-best world. Section 4 introduces nancial frictions into the model and describes the ampli cation mechanism induced by the illiquidity of collateral. Section 5 discusses some implications for welfare and policy. A nal section concludes.
The structure of the model
Consider an economy in which a durable asset -land -serves as collateral for nancial contracts and as a factor of production. Land is in xed total supply, K , and is used by each of three sectors to produce a single, perishable, consumption good. Two of these sectors are farms, f D m; r , that will be subject to collateral constraints. The remaining sector, which is unconstrained throughout, acts as a buffer that provides an alternative use for the collateralised asset. To x ideas, we label the sectors as mango farms (m), rice farms (r ), and banks (b) respectively. There are two periods, and sectors begin with endowments of wealth that are potentially different, w where a is the marginal product of land in farming in the absence of shocks, and s f t is a stochastic productivity shock. Shocks to productivity only occur in the rst period and depend on two states of the world that occur with equal probability -a rainy state and a sunny state. Since mango farmers bene t from sun and are hindered by rain, while rice farmers bene t from rain and hindered by sun, we assume that the productivity shocks take the values and produce the consumption good with diminishing returns. Their production function is not subject to productivity shocks and takes a quadratic form
We suppose that 2K > A a > 0, which ensures that both farmers and bankers hold a positive quantity of land in equilibrium. Following Krishnamurthy (2003) , bankers are assumed to have ample endowments of the consumption good in each period.
Farmers trade one-period state-contingent nancial contracts with bankers for insurance across states and to help transfer consumption through time. These Arrow-Debreu securities are purchased/sold at the start of period t, and pay one unit of the consumption good at the end of that period if the agreed state of the world materialises. The payoff of the security is zero otherwise.
Let t f 0 1 and t f 00 1 denote the quantity of nancial claims held by farmers that pay out at the end of period 1 in the rainy and sunny states respectively. With no production uncertainty in period 2, there is only one Arrow-Debreu security, t f 2 : The common component within the quantities of the state-contingent contracts t f 0 1 and t f 00 1 re ects borrowing/lending, while differences in the quantities re ect the insurance component. (6) (6) For example, a mango farmer who borrows ve units from the bank and takes out two units of insurance pays out ve units of the consumption good at the end of the period as repayment, plus a further two if it has been sunny or, if it has been rainy, receives two units. This is equivalent to selling three Arrow-Debreu securities that pay out in the rainy state and seven that pay out in the sunny state.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the start of period 1, farmers and bankers allocate their initial wealth, w 1 , to purchases of land, nancial contracts, and current consumption. We do not presume that w m 1 D w r 1 .
(7) The strength of demand for land relative to the xed supply determines the rst period land price, q 1 , while nancial claims that deliver in the rainy and sunny states trade for p 0 1 and p 00 1 respectively. The state of the world is realised during the period, so the resulting start-of-period 2 wealth, w 2 , will vary across states. This consists of output, plus any payoffs from Arrow-Debreu securities, and the value of land holdings at the end of period 1.
In period 2, wealth is again allocated between consumption, purchases of land for production, and purchases of nancial contracts at price p 2 . The demand for land determines the equilibrium price at the start of the period, q 2 . Importantly, q 2 depends on the state of the world in period 1 -rain or sun. Production then takes place and is supplemented by payoffs from any Arrow-Debreu securities. With no further production periods, land holdings cease to have value at the end of the second period. Chart 1 illustrates the timing of the model. We rst consider the benchmark case of complete nancial markets. Since farmers know that their sectors are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, they are motivated to hold Arrow-Debreu securities, (7) Indeed, we assume that w m 1 is generally different to w r 1 . Otherwise productivity shocks have no aggregate consequences, as the effects of a positive shock to one farmer will be perfectly offset by the effects of the negative shock to the other farmer.
which replicate claims on sectors other than their own, in order to share risk. With complete nancial markets, Arrow-Debreu securities exist for all states and can be traded in potentially unlimited quantities.
Bankers
The model is solved by working backwards from period 2. We begin by considering the banking sector, since the risk-neutrality of bankers pins down the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities in the model. Bankers aim to maximise start-of-period 2 consumption, c b 2 , plus discounted end-of-game consumption (output in the nal period) minus transfers made to mango and rice farmers when the single Arrow-Debreu security matures (t m 2 , t r 2 ). They face a budget constraint, namely that output at the start of period 2, together with the value of land and income from securities sold to farmers, must equal consumption, investment in land holdings, plus payments owed to farmers on nancial claims maturing from the previous period (t 
(1)
with rst-order conditions
In other words, bankers equate their discounted marginal product of land to the land price, and the price of the Arrow-Debreu security equals the inter-temporal rate of substitution, .
At the start of the rst period, bankers still aim to maximise consumption at the start of period 1, as well as expected consumption at the start of period 2 and at the end of the game. Start-of-period 2 consumption is period 1 output plus the value of land holdings, plus income from sales of the period 2 Arrow-Debreu security, minus the costs of period 2 land investment and payments to farmers who bought period-1 Arrow-Debreu securities. The budget constraint again requires that output, the value of land, and receipts from sales of nancial claims equal spending on consumption, land purchases and Arrow-Debreu payments. We thus have
with rst order conditions
and p
These conditions state that the period 1 price of land equals the expected discounted value of holding on to it. A unit of land is worth q 2 in period 2 and also generates an output
; at the margin. The price of a nancial claim is equal to its discounted actuarial value -the probability of a state occuring multiplied by the discount factor. The risk neutrality of bankers means that no risk premium is introduced into the price of insurance and that they are, thus, able to absorb any amount of Arrow-Debreu securities at the actuarial price.
Farmers
In similar fashion, the second period problem of the two farmers can be represented as Farmer's wealth at the end of the game comprises non-stochastic output and receipts from nancial claims purchased at the start of period 2. Again, the budget constraint requires that consumption, purchases of land for second period investment, and purchases of the period 2 nancial claim, priced by bankers at per unit, come from wealth. This wealth is comprised of period 1 output, the value of land at the start of period 2, and the payoffs from Arrow-Debreu securities at the end of period 1.
De ne start-of period 2 wealth as w
1 , which is state dependent. The rst order conditions are
and w f 2
From (6) and (7), we nd that q 2 D a , regardless of the state that occurred in period 1, ie 
As there is no uncertainty in period 2, nancial claims and the purchase of land for production both serve as vehicles to facilitate the transfer of consumption from the start of period 2 to the end of the game. Farmers' wealth at period 2 is used to nance current consumption, c f 2 ; and consumption at the end of the game, c f 3 . The optimal way to allocate this wealth is in the ratio 1 : , where is invested, via land or securities, for end-game consumption.
In equilibrium, farmers are indifferent between (a) selling the good for a claim that pays one unit for every purchased at the start of period 2; or (b) investing in production, which yields a for each unit of land purchased at price q 2 . It follows, therefore, that q 2 D a : And since both methods deliver a unit of consumption at the end of the game for each invested, c
The period 1 problem for the farmers is to maximise their expected discounted consumption 
Now, however, start-of-period 2 wealth level, w In other words, mango farmers buy more nancial securities that pay out in the rainy state than in the sunny state to compensate for output being relatively low. Moreover, they buy more nancial securities that pay out in the rainy state if the price of land is lower in the rainy state than in the sunny state. The difference in holdings of state-claims is also proportional to the scale of production.
The optimal holding of Arrow-Debreu securities by the mango farmer in the two states is given by
Similar expressions can be derived for the rice farmer. As equations (14) and (15) make clear, the rst two terms are equal in magnitude, but opposite in sign, to (a) the productivity shock on wealth; and (b) the loss relative to expectations in the value of land holdings. So farmers use nancial claims to fully insure themselves against productivity shocks and uctuations in land prices.
Farmers also transfer consumption across time with loans (the third term, which is the same across states). Since E.q 2 / D a , we observe that We now substitute the optimal nancial claim into the start-of-period 1 problem for the farmer.
With full insurance, wealth is constant so the demand for land is the same in both states and there can only be one land price at the start of period 2, ie E.q 2 / D q 2 : This gives the rst-order
which, in turn, implies
From the banker's problem, period 1 land prices are
ie the marginal product of the banking sector is equated with the marginal product of (aggregate) farming. Similarly, in the second period,
Finally, the market for land must clear in equilibrium. From banker's period 2 problem we know q 2 D a and from banker's period 1 problem, we can infer that q 1 D a .1 C /. The aggregate farming demand curve is not inconsistent with this. Farmers demand any quantity of land available at q 1 a .1 C / and q 2 a and zero otherwise.
Comparison with the rst-best
The decentralised equilibrium with complete nancial markets replicates the rst-best allocation of land chosen by a central planner. A planner who prefers aggregate output to be as high as possible in expectation, but as low as possible in variation might choose to maximise 
where =2 is an arbitrary weight re ecting the planner's dislike of output variability.
Making use of the fact that k
gives the following rst-order conditions with respect to k m t and K
The second of these implies that k
, ie land for farming should be split equally between the two farming sectors. Substituting this into the rst condition yields:
which is the same as in the decentralised equilibrium. The optimal strategy for the planner is to allocate land to the banking sector until its marginal product declines to the expected marginal product of the farmers. Subsequent land is then allocated 50:50 between the rice and mango farmers.
The 50:50 division ensures that uncertainty about the marginal product of (aggregate) farming is eliminated -favourable shocks to one farm are completely offset by the unfavourable shock to the other. With complete nancial markets, farmers are able to replicate the rst-best by selling state-claims to each other via the bank, which serves as an intermediary. The decentralised and planning solutions both ensure a non-stochastic aggregate outcome -the certain marginal product of banking is equated with the certain marginal product of aggregate farming in both periods.
Constraints on nancial claims
We now introduce nancial frictions into the model. In the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , we continue to assume that the banking sector is unconstrained, but that the absence of trust means farmers cannot credibly promise to pay out on nancial claims unless land is used as collateral to back the claim. Importantly, however, the amount a farmer can credibly commit is only a fraction 0 1; of the future value of land holdings. This could re ect different loan to value ratios across countries (as in footnote 5) or the fact that land is a relatively illiquid form of collateral which is dif cult to dispose of when obligations arise. 
Bankers
Since bankers are unconstrained, their period 1 and 2 problems are unchanged. The previous solutions for prices in each period therefore apply, namely
The notion of illiquidity that we have in mind is one of markets being unable to transact high volumes at a particular instant.
Farmers
Farmers are only able to purchase nancial claims to the extent that these securities are backed by the future value of land holdings. Land is worthless at the end of the game, so farmers cannot sell Arrow-Debreu securities to the bank at the start of period 2, as they would have no collateral to support the potential pay out. As a result, they are limited to transfering consumption from the start of period 2 to the end of the game via production.
The second period problem of the farmers is
; the farmers' problem can be written as max ln c m 1
The optimal holding of Arrow-Debreu securities by the mango farmer can now be readily contrasted with his holdings under complete nancial markets (equations (14), (15)). Speci cally, the rst-order conditions to the maximisation problem in (25) imply
Equation ( The second term in (26) shows the extent to which the mango farmer insulates his wealth from any uctuations in land prices. If D 1, trading in Arrow-Debreu securities may be supported up to the full value of collateral. As a result, wealth uncertainty due to uctuations in the value of collateral can be fully insured. This is the same as in the complete nancial markets case. But if < 1, insuf cient Arrow Debreu securities can be traded to fully insulate wealth from uctuations in the value of collateral. This is due to the limited pledgeability of land as collateral.
The dual role of land as a factor of production and as a collateral asset implies that land contributes to the transfer of wealth across time in two ways. It generates consumption goods during a production period and it maintains value as a tradable asset for use in future production periods. Both of these contributions to wealth are uncertain, but can be insured by unconstrained trading of Arrow-Debreu securities. The introduction of collateral constraints, however, implies that production risk can not be fully insured, while insurance of collateral values is also partial if Arrow-Debreu trading is less than fully collateralised ( < 1). In the rst case, uctuations in wealth and, hence, equilibrium land holdings and prices re ect only the fundamental productivity shocks. But when collateral values can not be fully insured, the effects of productivity shocks are ampli ed.
The ampli cation effect in our model arises as follows. A negative shock to the mango farmer leads to a decline in the demand for land by the mango farmer as his wealth declines, since he is unable to fully insure production risk and collateral values. If the mango farm is assumed to be the dominant sector, this leads to a fall in the price of land despite the positive effect of the shock on the rice farmer. As the future value of collateral declines for both types of farmer, the initial collateral constraint binds tighter, so that fewer Arrow-Debreu securities can be traded in the rst instance. This further reduces the degree of underinsurance and heightens the pecuniary externality imposed by the mango farmer on the rice farmer via the land price. As a result, the initial productivity shock is ampli ed and propagated, with signi cant effects on equilibrium land holdings and prices. Note that excess (over fundamental) asset price uncertainty emerges as a symptom of the lack of collateral. Chart 2 illustrates the logic of the ampli cation mechanism.
In our model, asset price uncertainty and ampli cation only occur when there is an asymmetry between the two farming sectors. If the two farmers had the same initial wealth and both were subject to collateral constraints in their respective favourable states of the world, then aggregate outcomes would be independent of the state. Although mango and rice farmers would make different contributions to aggregate wealth and the demand for land depending on whether it rained or was sunny, these variables and, hence, the price of land, would all be certain in this special case. In this situation, there is no asset price uncertainty and, therefore, no ampli cation.
As before, we now substitute the farmers' optimal holdings of Arrow-Debreu securitiesequations (26) and (27) -into the maximisation problem. This gives max ln The demand schedule is now downward sloping, rather than perfectly elastic. Without complete insurance, additional land purchases bring additional production and collateral value risk. This requires compensation in the form of a lower price.
Making use of the relationship for investment in land in period 2 (equation (25)), the mango farmer's demand for land in period 2 following rain is
And the demand for land in period 2 following sun is
Similar expressions can be obtained for the rice farmer.
To solve for land market equilibrium, we again sum the individual land demands in either period.
So equilibrium land prices in period 2, q 0 2 and q 00 2 , are given by the solutions to
While the equilibrium land price in period 1, q 1 , is given by
Equations (31) -(33) are cubic in nature and not amenable to closed form solutions. But land prices will depend on the deep parameters of the model: the degree of liquidity of the collateral asset, the distribution of wealth between the farmers, the banks' ability to absorb the collateral asset, the size of the shock, and the common discount factor. Changes in these parameters have implications for welfare, as we show below.
Welfare and policy implications
The welfare implications of nancial frictions can be characterised by decomposing the effects on equilibrium quantities and asset prices induced by the ampli cation mechanism. Production inef ciency can be measured by comparing farmers' period 1 land holdings with the rst best,
And asset price uncertainty can be gauged by the absolute difference between the potential post-shock land prices, q 0 2 q 00 2 . There is no inef ciency or asset price uncertainty in the rst best or in the case where collateral constraints do not bind.
Liquidity of the collateral asset
Chart 3 (left) and 3 (right), which are drawn for a set of baseline parameters, illustrate how the optimal allocation of land and asset price uncertainty vary with the liquidity of the collateral asset.
(9) The dark-shaded area in both gures illustrates the impact of ampli cation in the model. lower production further and further as the constraint tightens. The inability to fully insure wealth also leads to increasing asset price uncertainty -Chart 3 (right) -as discussed in Section 4.
Changes in wealth distribution
In our model, proportional productivity shocks are perfectly negatively correlated. Thus, when wealth is evenly distributed between the two farmers, a positive shock to one sector (which boosts aggregate wealth) is completely offset by the negative effects of the shock to the other sector. But should one sector receive a string of positive shocks, perhaps as a result of a clustering of technological innovations as in Borio et al (2001) , it starts to dominate the economy and aggregate wealth rises with each shock. This is because although each shock is as good for one sector as it is bad for the other in proportionate terms, it affects the wealth of the exapanding sector by more than that of the shrinking sector in absolute terms. Aggregate wealth is, therefore, procyclical.
Changes in wealth distribution also have implications for the ef ciency and volatility costs of nancial frictions. With uneven wealth, a positive shock to the dominant sector in period 1 generates a higher overall demand for land relative to a situation where the positive shock is received by the smaller sector. As a result, the demand for land and land prices become`less similar' across states. The lower is , the lower is the extent to which farmers' wealth is insured.
So the ampli cation mechanism creates a divergence in the effects of each sector on aggregate farming wealth. Chart 4 (right) shows how asset price uncertainty and the ampli cation effect increase as wealth distribution becomes more uneven. The ampli cation effect also affects the allocation of land. If D 1; the value of collateral is fully insured and farmers only face uncertain output. In response to this uncertainty, farmers scale back production relative to the rst best -as Chart 4 (left) shows. But if < 1; farmers are unable to fully insure collateral values, so wealth becomes more variable for a given scale of production. If the distribution of wealth is uneven, increased asset price uncertainty and the ampli cation effect tighten constraints, forcing land holdings and production to be curtailed further.
Public supply of liquidity
The model helps illustrate how there may be scope for policymakers to promote the liquidity of nancial markets -to limit the welfare costs of nancial frictions and damaging uctuations in asset prices, and facilitate the transfer of wealth from one period to another. One approach, discussed by Borio et al (2001) , is the pursuit of discretionary policy towards collateral valuation practices in anticipation of the economy being hit by negative shocks. Thus, authorities may lower margin requirements and relax lending limits placed on assets serving as collateral, and relate provisions to the loan to value ratio. (10) Policies that induce market participants to hold liquidity cushions at business-cycle frequencies -building liquidity up during booms and drawing it down during recessions -could help curb the procyclicality of the nancial system and improve welfare.
An alternative approach to alleviating the welfare costs of nancial frictions may be for the central bank to act as a liquidity provider, converting the illiquid asset into something more liquid. Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) suggest that the central bank could purchase the collateral asset in an open market operation and use the stream of income to`retire' money, ie offer a dividend on money. Central bank collateral policy may also contribute towards a reduction in the illiquidity of collateral. By accepting a broad range of assets as collateral, the central bank may in uence the preferences of the private sector, reducing the doubts and costs associated with a collateral pledge.
Final remarks
This paper has sought to formalise the intuition of the`new view' of nancial stability which lays stress on the role played by distortions to savings-investment decisions and the endogeneity of risk (10) For example, supervisory authorities in Japan lowered margin requirements and relaxed lending limits on collateral assets in order to alleviate liquidity constaints and contain distress selling during the stock market crash of 1987.
in driving the procyclicality of the economy. We demonstrate how the presence of nancial frictions -in the form of collateral constraints -can generate underinsurance, leading to less diversi cation and the build-up of systematic risk during upturns. A central aspect of ampli cation in the economic and nancial cycle is the role played by liquidity of available instruments ( nancial and non-nancial) that are used as collateral.
Our results contribute to the debate on the role of policy in limiting the welfare costs of nancial stability by decomposing the effects on equilibrium quantities and asset prices induced by the collateral ampli cation mechanism. In our framework, discretionary regulatory instruments, such as the size of haircuts to collateral values could help limit damaging asset price volatility. And central bank collateral policy, through its role in reducing the costs implicit in collateral pledges, may also play a part in alleviating the costs of nancial instability.
An important limitation of our model is the limited role of nancial intermediaries. The banking sector is passive, merely serving as a channel through which agents in the real sector insure each other. Clearly, frictions in nancial intermediation are a key aspect of any analysis of nancial stability. Existing models that consider the macroeconomic consequences of these frictions largely eschew insurance markets and do not allow intermediaries to hedge shocks. Developing richer models of risk-sharing capacity that incorporate capital markets and frictions in intermediation is an important next step for future research.
Appendix 1: The other constrained cases 
Parameter constraints
Both constraints bind for all valid parameter combinations that have not already been associated with no constraints binding or the constraints binding only in the good state.
